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401 
The Patent Litigation Explosion 
James Bessen and Michael J. Meurer* 
This Article provides the first look at patent litigation hazards for 
public firms during the 1980s and 1990s.  Litigation is more likely when 
prospective plaintiffs acquire more patents, when firms are larger and 
technologically close and when prospective defendants spend more on 
research and development (“R&D”).  The latter suggests inadvertent 
infringement may be more important than piracy.  Public firms face 
dramatically increased hazards of litigation as plaintiffs and even more 
rapidly increasing hazards as defendants, especially for small public 
firms.  The increase cannot be explained by patenting rates, R&D, firm 
value or industry composition.  Legal changes are the most likely 
explanation.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The annual number of patent lawsuits filed in the United States more 
than tripled since 1990.1  Is this cause for concern? 
Other research suggests that patent litigation can affect innovation 
incentives.  Economic historian Zorina Khan argues that the introduction 
of the patent examination system during the nineteenth century reduced 
the relative number of patent lawsuits and that this substantially spurred 
inventive activity.2  Josh Lerner finds that the threat of litigation deters 
biotech firms from innovating in some technology fields.3  Lanjouw and 
Lerner find that the use of preliminary injunctions by large firms 
discourages research and development (“R&D”) by small firms.4  Does 
the recent jump in patent litigation reduce the incentives firms have to 
innovate? 
The answer depends on what is driving the increase.  To understand 
this, we take a comprehensive look at the factors that cause the disputes 
that result in litigation.  Our analysis is based on a formal theoretical 
model presented in a companion paper.5 
 
1. See PRICE WATERHOUSE COOPERS, 2012 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY 6 (2012), available at 
http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/forensic-services/publications/assets/2012-patent-litigation-
study.pdf (reporting an annual 6.4% growth in patent actions filed from 1991 through 2011); see 
also id. at 6 fig.1 (documenting the number of patent case filings made and patents granted from 
1991 to 2011).  As discussed below, this figure represents case filings reported by the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office and this series only captures about two-thirds of all filings.  However, 
the degree of under-reporting is stable over time, so the nature of the trend in total filings is the 
same. 
2. See B. ZORINA KHAN, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF INVENTION: PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS 
IN AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1790–1920, at 60 (2004) (explaining that the patent 
examination system “reduced uncertainty about the validity of patents” and “enabled financially 
disadvantaged inventors to appropriate returns through the market for invention”). 
3. Josh Lerner, Patenting in the Shadow of Competitors, 38 J.L. & ECON. 463, 463 (1995). 
4. Jean O. Lanjouw & Josh Lerner, Tilting the Table?  The Use of Preliminary Injunctions, 44 
J.L. & ECON. 573, 573 (2001). 
5. See James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Patent Litigation with Endogenous Disputes, 96 AM. 
ECON. REV. 77, 77 (2006) (presenting a model of patent disputes that considers behavior by 
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In an ideal world, patents would work like real property and be largely 
self-policing: technology adopters would either completely avoid 
patented technologies or they would obtain ex ante licenses before 
sinking funds into development and commercialization.  But unlike real 
property, where, say, few disputes arise over land boundaries after 
buildings have been erected, technology adopters do end up in court for 
investments they have made in allegedly infringing technologies. 
Two different stories might explain the origin of these disputes.  In 
one, the patent holder may not know about the infringer.  In this 
“cheating” story, the technology adopter observes and imitates a patented 
technology, and may take steps to avoid detection.  This behavior induces 
the patent holder to expend resources monitoring for infringement and, 
on the occasion that infringement is discovered, to expend additional 
resources on negotiating a license and/or on litigation.  These costs 
effectively increase the cost of patenting, making patents less attractive, 
and thus ultimately reducing R&D incentives. 
In the other story, the adopter develops its own technology and is 
unaware of another firm’s putative patent rights.  This kind of innocent 
infringement occurs because patent rights often have uncertain 
boundaries or questionable validity.  Patents differ from real property 
where the boundaries of a plot of land and the validity of a title usually 
can be verified at little cost and with little uncertainty.  In contrast, the 
validity of a patent may be challenged and firms often have difficulty 
determining whether a technology infringes the boundaries of a patent’s 
claims.  Indeed, even district court judges have difficulty determining the 
boundaries of patent claims—30–40% of their claim interpretation 
decisions are reversed on appeal.6  In addition, the sheer number of 
patents facing a typical innovator makes careful assessment quite 
burdensome.  Furthermore, patent claims are often hidden (sometimes 
strategically) until after firms have sunk technology investments. 
We call this the “exposure” story, because the more that firms invest 
in technology, the more they are exposed to the risk of a patent dispute.  
These disputes yield litigation or licensing under the threat of litigation, 
and sap rents from innovative firms.  The reduction in rents relative to a 
situation with clearly defined and certain property rights can be viewed 
as the cost of patent disputes.  This cost reduces innovators’ incentives to 
invest in R&D. 
 
potential infringers and patent infringement “defendants who ‘invent around’ a patent, and 
defendants who are unaware of the patented technology”). 
6. Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable?, 
9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 246 (2005).   
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These two stories affect the significance of the increase in patent 
litigation.  If the “exposure” story is correct, then there is reason for 
concern.  We find that the risk of being sued for infringement has 
increased by about 70% per R&D dollar.  In this case, then, the increased 
rate of litigation means that innovative firms have lower incentives to 
invest in R&D. 
If, on the other hand, the “cheating” story is correct, then the impact of 
the patent litigation explosion is less troubling.  This is because the 
expected number of suits per patent has not risen much, so patent holders 
may not face markedly higher costs of enforcement per patent.  Of course, 
there still may be a negative effect on alleged infringers’ R&D (which 
may be socially beneficial) and litigation may waste resources, but the 
“cheating” story does not generate such a clear concern about litigation. 
Our empirical analysis aims to nest both stories, to distinguish between 
them and to evaluate which factors are driving the increase in litigation.  
We conduct this analysis at two levels.  First, we study the probability 
that one randomly selected firm files suit against another randomly 
selected firm in the same industry in a given year.  Among the right hand 
side variables we include the size of each firm’s patent portfolio, 
employment, R&D spending and market value and the technological 
proximity of the two firms.  This allows us to test various theoretical 
explanations of firm litigation.  Second, we perform an aggregate 
analysis, studying the hazards that a firm will engage in patent litigation 
as a plaintiff and, separately, as a defendant against all possible other 
parties.  This gives us a more comprehensive estimate of the contribution 
of different factors to the increase in aggregate litigation. 
Our Article differs from previous research in two principal ways.  First, 
our model of litigation addresses the origin of patent disputes, not just 
dispute settlement.  With the important exception of Crampes and 
Langinier,7 most of the theoretical literature on litigation takes the 
existence of a dispute as a given and then asks what factors determine 
whether the disputants will settle or proceed to trial.8  Much of the 
 
7. Claude Crampes & Corinne Langinier, Litigation and Settlement in Patent Infringement 
Cases, 33 RAND J. ECON. 258, 258–74 (2002) (studying decisions faced by a firm that is already 
a patent owner, such as how to monitor patents and react to infringement). 
8. For recent surveys, see Bruce Hay & Kathy Spier, Settlement of Litigation, in THE NEW 
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 442, 442–51 (1998); Jean O. Lanjouw & 
Josh Lerner, The Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights: A Survey of the Empirical Literature 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6296, 1997).  Models of patent settlement 
used in empirical research are found in Dietmar Harhoff & Markus Reitzig, Determinants of 
Opposition Against EPO Patent Grants—The Case of Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals, 22/4 
INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 443, 443–80 (2004), and Deepak Somaya, Strategic Determinants of 
Decisions Not to Settle Patent Litigation, 24 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 17, 17–38 (2003), available at 
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empirical literature follows suit.9  But the rate of lawsuit filing depends 
as much on the frequency of disputes as the frequency of bargaining 
breakdown.  Our model incorporates both.  We assume patent-related 
investments by one firm and investments related to the development and 
adoption of technology by another firm interact to create patent disputes.  
Attention to the origins of disputes is important because our data suggest 
that (after controlling for the number of inventions) more frequent 
disputes, not more frequent bargaining failures, are driving the increase 
in patent lawsuit filing. 
Second, our analysis differs from most previous research in that we use 
the firm as the unit of analysis as well as randomly selected pairs of firms.  
Our aim is to understand how firm choices affect litigation rates and how 
firms are affected by litigation hazards, so this is a natural modeling 
choice.  With the important exception of Rosemarie Ziedonis’s study of 
semiconductor industry patent litigation,10 most studies have either 
looked at the rate of litigation per patent11 or have looked at aggregate 
litigation rates.12  Although these statistics are informative, our model 
provides a richer, multi-factor picture of firm litigation behavior that can 
distinguish between a variety of possible explanations for the increase in 
litigation rates. 
The rest of this Article proceeds as follows.  Part I describes our model 
of patent disputes, some hypotheses from this model and the specification 
of equations we estimate.  Part II describes our data and Part III reports 
our empirical results.  Part IV discusses the interpretation of these results 
 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/smj.281/pdf. 
9. See e.g., Michael J. Meurer, The Settlement of Patent Litigation, 20 RAND J.  ECON. 77, 77–
91 (1989) (discussing a “settlement bargain between a patentee and a potential patent challenger”); 
Somaya, supra note 8, at 17–18 (documenting empirical studies to better understand the role of 
patent litigation in technology firm strategy). 
10. Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, Patent Litigation in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, in PATENTS 
IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 180, 182 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 
2003) (examining the characteristics of patent-related lawsuits in the semiconductor industry from 
1973 to 2001). 
11. See, e.g., John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley, Kimberly A. Moore & R. Derek Trunkey, 
Valuable Patents, 92 GEO L.J. 435, 435–79 (2004) [hereinafter Allison et al., Valuable Patents] 
(studying litigated patents in an effort to identify characteristics of the most valuable patents); Jean 
O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Protecting Intellectual Property Rights: Are Small Firms 
Handicapped?, 47 J.L. & ECON. 45, 45–74 (2004) [hereinafter Lanjouw & Schankerman, Small 
Firms] (analyzing the rate of litigation per patent to show that individuals or small firms owning 
few patents face greater litigation risk than firms with larger patent portfolios). 
12. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2003); Jon F. Merz & Nicholas M. Pace, Trends in Patent 
Litigation: The Apparent Influence of Strengthened Patents Attributable to the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 579, 579–80 (1994) (analyzing 
aggregate litigation rates to show how the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit contributed to 
increased predictability and enforceability of patents).  
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and a conclusion follows. 
I. MODEL AND SPECIFICATION 
A. Dispute, Filing and Settlement 
Our model concerns the probability that firm 1 will file a lawsuit 
against firm 2.  We present just a brief overview of the model and the 
intuitions that lead to testable hypotheses.  The details of the model are 
available in a companion paper.13  Initially, the firms simultaneously 
choose their levels of R&D spending.  Firm 1 also chooses the quantity 
and quality of patents it obtains.  In addition to choosing to obtain more 
patents, firm 1 can “refine” the (private) quality of its patents by delaying 
the issuance of some of its patents through continuation practice, crafting 
multiple claims, investing in high quality claims and disclosures and 
conducting a careful prior art search. 
At this stage, the firms do not know the probability that firm 1 will win 
a lawsuit if it files one.  They do, however, know the distribution of these 
probabilities.  In addition, each firm’s investments may alter this 
distribution.  If firm 1 gets more patents or better quality patents, then it 
will be more likely to win.  Firm 2’s R&D investment may also alter the 
probability of a win.  If firm 2 invests R&D in “inventing around,” then 
firm 1 will be less likely to win.  Alternatively, firm 2’s investment in 
new technology may expose it to greater risk of infringement, increasing 
the probability that firm 1 will win a suit. 
After the investments are made, the actual probability is revealed and 
the firms choose actions with four possible outcomes: firm 2 may decide 
to abandon its investment (or seek an ex post license); firm 1 may ignore 
firm 2; or they may enter a dispute.  In this last case, they either negotiate 
a settlement without filing a lawsuit, or firm 1 files a lawsuit (subsequent 
settlement may still occur). 
We make a simple assumption to analyze the factors that will affect 
the probability of litigation: we assume that the distribution of win 
probabilities is skewed to the left, meaning that most randomly selected 
pairs of firms have a low probability of suing each other and winning.14  
This means that factors that shift the probability distribution to the right 
(left) will increase (decrease) the probability of litigation. 
Given this set up, the following intuitions can be formally 
 
13. Bessen & Meurer, supra note 5, at 77–79. 
14. More precisely, we assume that the probability density decreases monotonically.  We also 
assume that firm variables are correlated with business unit variables, for example, larger firms 
have larger product markets.  This is important because the model really concerns the interaction 
between business units of the two firms, but our observed variables are at the firm level. 
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demonstrated: 
H1: Technological Distance.  The probability of litigation between 
two firms increases with their proximity in technological space, all 
else equal. 
The intuition here is simply that a firm pursuing technology “near” 
another firm’s patent portfolio exposes itself to greater risk of 
infringement. 
H2: Stakes.  The probability of litigation between two firms increases 
with the size of the stakes, all else equal. 
Greater stakes mean that firm 1 will prefer to sue rather than settle for 
a greater range of situations.  Greater stakes also mean that firm 2 will 
rather litigate than abandon development for a greater range of situations. 
H3: Patent Portfolio.  The probability that firm 1 sues firm 2 increases 
with the patent portfolio size of firm 1, all else equal. 
This hypothesis captures the notion that firm 1 increases its probability 
of winning with a greater number of patents, all else equal.  A larger 
number of patents means that a rival may be more likely to trip over one 
(exposure).  Also, a patent “fence” may limit the opportunities for rivals 
to invent around.15  If the probability distribution is shifted to the right, 
this means a greater probability of litigation.  Note that in general this 
increase need not be proportional, that is, the elasticity of the probability 
of filing with respect to firm 1’s patent portfolio size may be less than 
one. 
H4: Defensive Patenting.  If firms use patent portfolio trading to avoid 
litigation, then the probability that firm 1 sues firm 2 will decrease 
with firm 2’s patent portfolio size, all else equal. 
That is, firm 2’s “defensive” portfolio will increase the probability of 
settlement and reduce the probability of filing. 
The next two hypotheses concern the relationship between firm 2’s 
development investment and the probability of filing. 
H5: Inventing Around.  Controlling for the stakes of each firm, if firm 
2 uses development investment to “invent around” patents, then the 
probability of litigation should decrease with firm 2’s R&D, all else 
equal. 
The intuition here is that those prospective defendants who invest more 
 
15. Patent fencing is “a specific [patent] filing strategy to use multiple related patents to further 
enhance value appropriation.”  Christian Sternitzke, An Exploratory Analysis of Patent Fencing in 
Pharmaceuticals: The Case of PDE5 Inhibitors, 42 RES. POL’Y 542, 542 (2013).  For a discussion 
of patent fencing, see Wesley M. Cohen, Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, Protecting Their 
Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) 
1–5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000). 
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in inventing around will be less likely to be found to infringe firm 1’s 
patents, so firm 1 will be less likely to sue them.  Those firms that simply 
imitate without expending resources to invent around will be more likely 
to be sued. 
On the other hand, 
H6: Exposure Effect.  Controlling for the stakes of each firm, if firm 2 
increases its exposure to infringement by investing in technology, then 
the probability of litigation should increase with firm 2’s R&D, all else 
equal. 
This hypothesis captures the notion that prospective defendants who 
invest more in development (deliberately or inadvertently) expose 
themselves to greater risk of infringement.  Inadvertent infringement may 
be common because of the difficulty determining whether a technology 
is likely to infringe a patent, and because relevant patents may issue after 
development and even adoption is completed. 
These hypotheses encompass several variations of the model that may 
be helpful to understand what drives patent litigation and what may 
explain the trends in litigation. 
B. Specification 
These hypotheses can be nested in a simple regression.  We define a 
general logit regression equation: 
 
 
(1)  
 
 
where 
itX  is a vector of firm characteristics for firm i at time t and t  is 
a time dummy.  Following the above discussion, this vector might include 
the R&D spending, scale (employment), patent portfolio sizes of both 
firms and the technological distance between them.  This equation is 
estimated over pairs of firms who are potential litigants. 
Because the potential number of pairs of firms is very large and 
because we want to understand the aggregate effect of litigation on firms, 
it is also helpful to calculate firm hazards.  As long as the probability that 
firm A sues firm B is independent of the probability that firm A sues firm 
C, etc., the expected number of suits can be calculated as sums of these 
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probabilities: 
 
Note further that if z and y are sufficiently small,  zey tABt  1

.  
Using this approximation, 
 
 
(2)  
 
 
 
where tX  is the mean over firms and X  is the mean over firms and years.  
Note that this form is the familiar log linear Poisson regression.  A similar 
expression can be derived for the defendant’s hazard, 
 
(3)  
 
Finally, note that if there are no interaction terms in (1), that is, if 
0 , then    and   .  In words, the coefficients of the Poisson 
regressions, (2) and (3), should match those of the corresponding 
variables in the logit pairs regression, (1). 
II. DATA DESCRIPTION 
A. Data Sources 
Our research matches records from three data sources: lawsuit filings 
from Derwent’s Litalert database, firm financial data from Compustat and 
patent data from the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(“USPTO”) made available by The National Bureau of Economic 
Research (“NBER”). 
As in most of the prior research, we use lawsuit filings as our measure 
of litigation.  Patent disputes are properly viewed as a process consisting 
of many stages where settlement is possible at each stage and costs are 
incurred during each stage.  Although a trial is the costliest stage, the 
majority of legal costs occur prior to trial16 and opportunity costs 
experienced by the firm (e.g., postponed business) may also be quite 
large.17  Furthermore, significant costs may be incurred even when patent 
 
16. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 16 (2003). 
17. See Catherine Tucker, Patent Trolls and Technology Diffusion 1–28 (Tilberg Law and Econ. 
Ctr., Discussion Paper No. 2012–030, 2013) (documenting how a patent troll’s lawsuit against an 
imaging software sales company caused sales to decline by one-third due to a “lack of incremental 
product innovation” throughout litigation). 
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disputes are resolved prior to filing a lawsuit.18  Thus the event of a filing 
represents a foregone opportunity to settle and a credible commitment to 
incur some level of litigation cost that could have been avoided. 
Our primary source of information on lawsuit filings is Derwent’s 
Litalert database, a database that has been used by several previous 
researchers.19  Federal courts are required to report all lawsuits filed that 
involve patents to the USPTO and Derwent’s data is based on these 
filings.  Beginning with the Derwent data from 1984 through 2000, we 
removed duplicate records involving the same lawsuit as identified by 
Derwent’s cross-reference fields.  We also removed lawsuits filed on the 
same day, with the same docket number and involving the same primary 
patent.  Sometimes firms respond to lawsuits by filing counter-suits of 
their own, perhaps involving other patents.  Since our main focus is on 
disputes rather than on lawsuit filings per se, we also removed filings 
made within ninety days of a given suit that involved the same parties.  
Finally, we removed filings where the current USPTO Commissioner was 
a party.  This left us with 16,534 lawsuits filed from 1984 through 2000 
(see Figure 1).  Almost all of these lawsuits involved utility patents, 
including re-issued patents.20 
Previous researchers have found that apparently not all lawsuits 
involving patents do, in fact, get reported to the USPTO.  The Federal 
Judicial Center (“FJC”) collects data directly from the administrative 
office of the courts and the FJC consistently reports a larger number of 
filings.  Two potential problems arise from under-reporting: (1) a possible 
change in the reporting ratio over time, leading to spurious trends in the 
Derwent data; and (2) possible selection bias.  After de-duplicating FJC 
data, we found that our database had only 64% of the number of lawsuits 
contained in the FJC data.  However, although there was some year-to-
year variation in this ratio, it appeared to be stable over time: the ratio 
averaged 63.9% from 1984–90 and 64.1% from 1991–99.  There thus 
appears to be no significant trend in this reporting ratio.21  Also, using an 
 
18. See James E. Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 
CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 16–17, 30 tbl.3) (on file with author) (finding 
that “non-litigated patent assertions are responsible for much of the direct costs imposed by [non-
practicing entities] on operating companies”). 
19. See, e.g., Lanjouw & Schankerman, Small Firms, supra note 11, at 45; Ziedonis, supra note 
10, at 196–98. 
20. In a small percentage of cases Derwent did not report a patent or listed a design patent.  
21. Lanjouw and Schankerman report that their comparable ratio was stable during the 1990s.  
Lanjouw & Schankerman, Small Firms, supra note 11, at 50.  At the suggestion of Zorina Khan, 
we also compared our data to counts of lawsuit activity from LexisNexis, even though these data 
are not directly comparable.  The ratio of LexisNexis counts to FJC data, however, did exhibit 
marked variation over time. 
BESSEN AND MEURER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/11/2013  5:36 PM 
2013] The Patent Litigation Explosion 411 
extensive match between the two files, Lanjouw and Schankerman find 
no difference between reported and unreported cases over a range of 
variables, providing no suggestion of selection bias.22  Since the FJC data 
do not report all parties to a lawsuit, we chose to use the Derwent data 
despite this under-reporting.  In the tables below, when we report firm 
litigation hazards, these estimates have been corrected for under-
reporting (they have been divided by .64). 
To explore characteristics of firms involved in these lawsuits, we 
matched the listed plaintiffs and defendants to the Compustat database of 
U.S. firms from 1984–99 that report financials (excluding American 
Depository Receipts of foreign firms traded on U.S. exchanges).  These 
data were based on merged historical data tapes from Compustat and 
involved an extensive process of tracking firms through various types of 
re-organization and eliminating duplicate records for firms (e.g., 
consolidated subsidiaries listed separately from their parent 
companies).23 
The lawsuit data were matched to the Compustat data by comparing 
the litigant name with all domestic firm names in Compustat and also a 
list of subsidiary names used in Bessen and Hunt.24  At least one party 
was identified as a publicly traded U.S. firm in 42% of the 16,534 cases. 
To check the validity and coverage of this match, we randomly 
selected a number of parties to suits and then checked them manually 
using various databases including PACER, LexisNexis, the Directory of 
Corporate Affiliations and the LexisNexis M&A databases.  Although we 
were not able to definitively identify all parties, the rate of false positives 
was not more than 3% (no more than 5 of 165 parties were found to have 
been falsely matched) and the rate of false negatives was no more than 
7% (no more than 34 of 502 public companies were not matched). 
To obtain information about each firm’s non-litigated patents, we also 
matched Compustat firms to the NBER patent database.25  To match the 
USPTO assignee name to the Compustat firm name, we began with the 
 
22. Id. 
23. This work was conducted by Bob Hunt and Annette Fratantaro at the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Philadelphia for an earlier project and we thank them for graciously sharing it with us.  
24. James Bessen & Robert M. Hunt, An Empirical Look at Software Patents 12–13, 42 (Bos. 
Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 03–17/R, 2004).  A software program identified and scored 
likely name matches, taking into account spelling errors, abbreviations and common alternatives 
for legal forms of organization.  These were then manually reviewed and accepted or rejected.  Note 
that this match is based on the actual parties to litigation, not the original assignee of the patent at 
issue. 
25. See Bronwyn H. Hall, Adam B. Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg, The NBER Patent Citations 
Data File: Lessons, Insights and Methodological Tools 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 8498, 2001) (describing the NBER database on U.S. patents). 
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match file provided by the NBER.  To this we added matches on 
subsidiaries developed by Bessen and Hunt,26 manually matched names 
for large patenters and R&D-performers and matched a large number of 
additional firms using a name-matching program.27  In addition, using 
data on mergers and acquisitions from the Thomson Reuters Securities 
Data Company Platinum (“SDC”) database,28 we tracked patent 
assignees to their acquiring firms.  Since a public firm may be acquired, 
yet still receive patents as a subsidiary of its acquirer, we matched patents 
assigned to an acquired entity in a given year to the firm that owned that 
entity in that year.29  This matched group of firms includes 10,736 patent 
assignees matched to one of 8444 owning firms in Compustat, with as 
many as five different owners matched to each assignee.  This matched 
group accounts for 96% of the R&D performed by all U.S. Compustat 
firms, 77% of all R&D-reporting firms listed in Compustat and 62% of 
all patents issued to domestic non-governmental organizations during the 
sample period.  Sample statistics show that this matched sample is 
broadly representative of the entire Compustat sample, although it is 
slightly weighted toward larger and incumbent firms.  Testing our match 
against a sample of 131 semiconductor industry firms that had been 
manually matched, we correctly matched 90% of the firms that accounted 
for 99.5% of the patents acquired by this group.30 
B. Variables 
The main variables of interest are as follows: 
The number of suits per firm per year.  This is the number of suits to 
which the firm is a party.  We also sought to determine whether the firm 
was attempting to enforce a patent or whether the firm was seeking to 
defend against a patent.  The Derwent data do not distinguish whether the 
suit filed is an infringement suit or a declaratory judgment suit.  As a 
prerequisite to filing a declaratory action, a firm must show it has been 
threatened with an infringement suit; the declaratory action aims for a 
judgment that the patent is uninfringed or invalid.  To classify each suit, 
 
26. Bessen & Hunt, supra note 24; see also supra text accompanying note 24. 
27. A similar software program determined matches between the two files by identifying firm 
names that matched after taking into account spelling errors, abbreviations and common 
alternatives for legal forms of organization.  In addition, a separate program identified Compustat 
firms with unique names that were not found in the USPTO assignee file.  These were classified as 
firms that did not obtain patents through 1999. 
28. SDC PLATINUM, http://thomsonreuters.com/sdc-platinum/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2013). 
29. This dynamic matching process is different from that used in the original NBER data set, 
which statically matched a patent assignee to a Compustat firm.  These data were developed with 
the help of Megan MacGarvie, to whom we are indebted.  
30. Thanks to Rosemarie Ziedonis, who originally compiled this data, for sharing it with us. 
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we first identified whether the patent assignee at issue matched one of the 
parties to the suit.  If the assignee matched a plaintiff, the suit was 
classified as an infringement suit; if the assignee matched a defendant, 
the suit was classified as a declaratory action.  We were able to match the 
assignee for 83% of the suits, and of these, only 17% were declaratory 
actions.31  If the assignee did not match a party to the suit, then it was 
classified as an infringement suit because there are relatively few 
declaratory actions.32  This classification then allowed us to create two 
new variables: (1) the number of suits per year for which the firm was a 
“patentee litigant” (that is, plaintiff in an infringement suit or defendant 
in a declaratory action); and (2) the number of suits per year for which 
the firm was an “alleged infringer” (the reverse).33  Below, when we 
speak of one firm “suing” another, we mean the suing firm is a patentee 
litigant and the other is an alleged infringer, even though the suing firm 
may not actually be the plaintiff. 
Portfolio size.  To obtain a measure of firm patent portfolio size, we 
used the number of patents assigned to the firm over the previous eight 
years.  We chose eight years because this number allowed us to capture a 
reasonable measure of the patents effectively in force without consuming 
too much of our sample.  This is our main proxy for patent refinement 
effort. 
Patent characteristics.  We also estimated the “adjusted” number of 
claims per patent, citations made per patent (backward citations) and 
citations received per patent (forward citations) for the litigated patents 
and also for the firm’s entire patent portfolio.  Since these characteristics 
tend to change across patent classes, the “adjusted” characteristics are 
estimated as deviations from the mean of the patent’s class. 
Newly public firm.  This dummy variable is set to one only during the 
first five years in which the firm appears in Compustat.  This group 
largely consists of firms that have recently gone public, and these are 
largely young firms. 
 
31. These numbers are quite similar to findings by Moore, Lanjouw and Schankerman.  See 
Lanjouw & Schankerman, Small Firms, supra note 11, at 50 (reporting that 85% of patent suits 
were infringement suits, as opposed to declaratory judgments); Kimberly A. Moore, Jury Demands: 
Who’s Asking?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 847, 853 n.19 (2002) (finding that the “accused infringer, 
rather than the patent holder, filed suit in the form of a declaratory judgment action” in 15% of 
cases).  
32. We ran our analysis after excluding cases without a matched assignee and the results were 
broadly similar.  
33. There are some observable differences between, say, plaintiffs in infringement cases and 
defendants in declaratory actions (the latter tend to be somewhat larger firms).  However, we ran 
our analysis separately for these different groups and the results were broadly similar.  For this 
reason, we only report the combined results here. 
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Industry groups.  We divide firms into eight industry groups according 
to their primary product category as identified by Compustat: SIC 28 
(chemicals, including pharmaceuticals), SIC 35 (machinery, including 
computers), SIC 36 (electronics), SIC 38 (instruments), other 
manufacturing (SIC 20–39, excluding the above), SIC 73 (business 
services including software), SIC 50–59 (retail and wholesale) and other 
non-manufacturing.  These classifications use the SIC code assigned by 
Compustat for the primary line of business of the firm for the given year. 
Technological closeness.  Two firms may use similar technologies or 
very different technologies.  To measure their technological “closeness,” 
we calculate a measure developed by Jaffe.34  This measure is computed 
by first calculating the share of each firm’s patents the USPTO assigns to 
each technology class as the patent’s primary classification.  For each 
firm we get a vector of 426 class shares.  The technological closeness of 
two firms is calculated as the uncentered correlation of the two 
corresponding vectors.  We do this calculation for all public firms with 
patents over two time periods: 1984–91 and 1992–99.  Also, for each 
firm, we compute weighted sums of other firms’ patent portfolio sizes 
and other firms’ R&D expenditures using the closeness measure as a 
weight.  These measures represent the number of patents and R&D 
spending in the firm’s “neighborhood.” 
Firm financial and other data.  These include: employees in 
thousands; R&D, cashflow and sales all deflated by the GDP deflator; 
capital defined as property, plant and equipment deflated by the NIPA 
capital goods deflator; and firm market value (long term debt plus the 
market value of common and preferred stock). 
C. Characteristics of the Samples 
We use two main samples in our analysis.  The first is the matched 
sample described above with 118,495 firm-year observations from 1984–
99.  The second sample is generated from the first.  It consists of 
observations of pairs of firms for each year and we use this to explore the 
probability that one firm will sue another.  All pairs of firms that share 
the same primary line of business (at the four-digit SIC level) are included 
twice (firm 1 sues firm 2 and firm 2 sues firm 1), comprising 1,240,580 
observations from 1984–99 after excluding cases with missing variables 
and firms in retail and wholesale industries. 
Table 1 shows means and medians of several variables estimated for 
firm-years from the basic Compustat sample.  The first column shows all 
 
34. Adam B. Jaffe, Technological Opportunity and Spillovers of R&D: Evidence from Firms’ 
Patents, Profits, and Market Value, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 984 (1986).  
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firm-years and the second shows just those observations with positive 
patent portfolio size.  The third column then shows observations where 
the firm was involved in one or more patent suits. 
Firms who patent tend to be larger and less likely to be newly public 
than all firms.  Firms involved in litigation tend to be much larger than 
these, although they are no less likely to be new firms.  Patent litigation 
is very much dominated by large, R&D-intensive firms in absolute terms.  
Below we look at relative hazards by size. 
The last two columns compare patentee litigants with alleged 
infringers.35  If patent infringement were largely a matter of low-tech 
copyists imitating patented products or processes, then we should see a 
much lower level of R&D spending among alleged infringers and much 
higher percentages of firms reporting no R&D and having no patent 
portfolios.  This is hardly the case.  Alleged infringers spend about the 
same on R&D as their accusers (more in the mean, slightly less in the 
median).  Alleged infringers do have a somewhat greater propensity to be 
firms who do not report R&D or who do not obtain patents (bear in mind, 
some defendants are distributors).  It is possible, of course, that relatively 
more low-tech copyists are found among unlisted firms. 
Patent litigants, both patentees and alleged infringers, tend to have 
relatively large patent portfolios on average.  We also report mean 
“adjusted” characteristics of these portfolios.  We adjust for differences 
over patent technology classes by reporting the means as deviations from 
the mean of the respective patent classes.  Thus public firms in general 
have more highly refined patents that contain more claims and make more 
citations than all patents in matching patent classes, presumably 
reflecting greater effort put into patent prosecution.  Public firms also 
receive more subsequent patent citations. 
But note that patentee litigants appear to put greater effort into patent 
refinement (they make more citations) than do other public firms.  
Alleged infringers obtain patents with fewer claims and backward 
citations.  This suggests a degree of endogeneity: firms anticipate that 
they may assert their patents and so they put extra resources into refining 
them so that they will more likely be held valid and infringed. 
Finally, note that patentee litigants have patent portfolios that receive 
more subsequent citations.  Thus, the average patent and not just the 
litigated patents owned by patent-asserting firms are cited more often, 
 
35. The last column excludes firms in the retail and wholesale industries.  Firms in these 
industries are often named in suits because they distribute allegedly infringing goods, but only 
rarely for making or using such goods themselves.  We exclude them here to provide a clearer 
picture of the extent to which alleged infringers are low-tech copyists.  Including these firms does 
not change the estimates substantially. 
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perhaps suggesting that forward patent citations are in part a response to 
litigious behavior.  This, plus the evidence above, suggests that the 
observed correlation other researchers have found between litigation and 
patent characteristics36 may involve causality that runs in both directions. 
III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
A. Basic Measures of Litigation Hazard 
Table 2 shows mean measures of litigation hazard for public firms with 
positive patent portfolios and positive R&D spending.  The first two 
columns show statistics for the hazard of the firm enforcing its patents as 
a patentee litigant and the first three rows show the overall hazards and 
the hazards for 1987 and 1999.  The first column shows the expected 
number of such suits per year.  The hazard grew substantially from 1987 
to 1999. 
The second column imputes a litigation rate per patent.  This is 
calculated as the mean annual number of suits in which firms are patentee 
litigants divided by the mean number of patents granted to firms per year.  
This estimate represents the mean number of suits per patent over the 
observed time period.37  In contrast to previous research, however, this 
estimate reflects the effective patent term.38  We estimate a hazard of 
1.18% of lawsuits per patent.  By comparison, Lanjouw and 
Schankerman report a rate of 1.04% lawsuits per patent for a sample of 
public firms.39  We might expect our figure to be somewhat higher 
because our estimate takes into account effective patent term and our 
sample of public firms includes many more small firms, who tend to have 
higher rates of litigation per patent.  Still, the correspondence is close. 
As Lanjouw and Schankerman point out, the hazard of litigation per 
 
36. See, e.g., Allison et al., Valuable Patents, supra note 11, at 437–39 (studying characteristics 
of litigated patents to determine characteristics of valuable patents); Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark 
Schankerman, The Quality of Ideas: Measuring Innovation with Multiple Indicators 2 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7345, 1999) (reporting correlations between 
litigation and four indicators: the number of patent claims, forward citations, backward citations 
and family size).  
37. Suppose the effective patent term is T, the grant rate is n and the litigation rate is l.  Then 
the firm’s effective patent portfolio at any time is n T, so the annual number of suits per patent is l 
/ nT and over the entire effective patent term the expected number of suits per patent is just l / n.  
Since the means are estimated over a limited time period, these estimates effectively assume that 
the litigation rate per patent is the same before, during and after the sample period.  Since the patent 
term is factored out, this estimate is robust to variation in T by construction. 
38. The effective patent term may be shorter than the statutory term of twenty years from the 
grant date because of failure to pay maintenance fees, because the technology becomes obsolete or 
because of financial distress to the assignee.  Patent terms can also be extended because of 
regulatory delay; this is common for pharmaceutical patents. 
39. Lanjouw & Schankerman, Small Firms, supra note 11, at 56. 
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patent did not change much during the 1990s.40  We show a small 
increase (11% over the interval from 1987 to 1999).  In effect, the 
increase in firm patenting rates largely offset the increase in the rate of 
litigation per firm. 
The measures for litigation hazards where the firm is the alleged 
infringer are shown in columns three and four.  The rate of litigation per 
R&D dollar is calculated as the sample mean rate of litigation per firm 
divided by the sample mean deflated R&D expenditure.41  In general, the 
hazard of a public firm being an alleged infringer has been slightly less 
than the hazard of the firm being a patentee litigant.  But the hazard of 
being an alleged infringer increased sharply, more than doubling from 
1987 to 1999.  Moreover, measured relative to R&D spending, the rate 
still increased sharply—the hazard of being sued for each dollar of R&D 
increased by 70% from 1987 to 1999. 
The next three rows show these measures for firms of different sizes 
and for newly public firms.  Lanjouw and Schankerman report that small 
firms have a much higher rate of litigation per patent,42 and we find the 
same.  A firm with fewer than 500 employees faces an enforcement 
hazard per patent that is about four times larger than the hazard faced by 
a larger firm.  In addition, we find that the hazard of being sued relative 
to R&D spending is nearly six times larger for a small firm.  Newly public 
firms show a similar pattern of increased relative hazards. 
These large differences emphasize that multiple factors influence these 
hazards.  A simple model where, say, the hazard of being a plaintiff is 
proportional to a firm’s patent portfolio size is likely to fit the data poorly.  
Instead, we need to use a multiple regression approach to understand the 
factors giving rise to trends in the hazards. 
Finally, the bottom of Table 2 shows these statistics reported for 
different industry groups.  Different industries seem to exhibit very 
different patterns.  The instruments industry has high hazards relative 
both to its patents and its R&D, while the business services industry has 
low litigation rates by both measures.  Chemicals including 
pharmaceuticals have a high rate of litigation per patent, but a low rate 
per R&D.  Electronics has the reverse: a low rate per patent and a high 
 
40. Id. at 50.  
41. If the rate of litigation per billion dollars of R&D is instead calculated as the mean individual 
ratio of the number of suits to R&D expenditures and this figure is trimmed of the upper 1% tail, 
the mean rate is 3.7 for the entire period, 1.3 for 1987 and 3.8 for 1999.  This represents a 193% 
increase from 1987 to 1999.  The weighted mean (weighted by R&D) increased 73% from 1987 to 
1999 (from 1.1 to 1.9). 
42. Id. at 63–70. 
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rate per R&D dollar.43 
Again, mono-causal explanations are unlikely to explain these diverse 
patterns.  For example, the semiconductor industry is sometimes 
described as having a low rate of litigation per patent because the 
complex technology gives rise to patent trading based on “mutually 
assured destruction.”44  But this explanation by itself seems unable to 
account for the above average rate of litigation relative to R&D spending 
in semiconductors. 
B. What Difference do Industry and Technological Closeness Make? 
We next look at characteristics of the pairs of firms involved in 
lawsuits.  Do firms tend to sue firms within their own industry or those 
in other industries?  Do they tend to sue firms that patent similar 
technologies or those that patent more remote technologies?  Table 3 
provides some simple analysis for suits where both plaintiffs and 
defendants are public firms. 
Surprisingly, only 29% of these suits occurred between firms whose 
primary line of business is in the same four-digit SIC industry.  But 28% 
involved firms that did not have a business segment in common even at 
the three-digit SIC level.  Compustat reports major business segments by 
industry of firms since 1985.  The second column of the Table includes 
pairs of firms who share businesses in the same three-digit classification 
but whose primary businesses are in different industries.  This is a very 
broad classification and likely includes many pairs that are not direct 
competitors (e.g., computer manufacturers and stapler manufacturers are 
in the same three-digit SIC classification).  Nevertheless, a substantial 
number of suits appear to involve firms that are not market competitors.45 
Perhaps many of these suits are between firms that use similar 
technologies.  We use the technology closeness measure described above 
to consider this possibility.  Firms within the same industry tend to have 
high closeness measures, but the closeness measure also varies 
independently of industry, e.g., Apple Computers and Intel do not 
compete directly in their major markets, but they have a closeness of 0.53.  
The first row in Table 3 shows the percentage of pairs with closeness of 
less than 0.5 and the second row those pairs with closeness greater than 
or equal to 0.5.  Still, 24% of the pairs neither share an industry segment 
 
43. See Ziedonis, supra note 10, at 184 (reporting similar numbers for the semiconductor 
industry). 
44. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, supra note 11, at 468. 
45. Some of these suits are probably against distributors of infringing products.  The Table 
excludes firms in the retail and wholesale industries for this reason.  However, manual inspection 
of some of the reported suits revealed that many are not against distributors. 
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nor are technologically close. 
Thus, although many suits, probably the majority, occur between firms 
that are close either in the market place or in their patent portfolios, a 
substantial percentage also occur between firms that are distant.  This 
suggests that it might be prohibitively expensive for firms to clear their 
innovations for possible infringement accurately.  There may simply be 
too many patent holders that pose a litigation threat but who have 
dissimilar technologies and products.  If so, then inadvertent infringement 
will not occur infrequently. 
C. Regression Analysis of Pairs 
To analyze what drives litigation, we begin by estimating logit 
regressions of the probability that a firm with given characteristics will 
sue a firm with other characteristics in a given year.  For tractability, we 
estimate this probability out of a sample of all pairs of firms who share 
the same primary industry.  We also exclude firms that are not matched 
to the patent database and firms in the retail and wholesale industries 
(there litigation is likely to be quite different and there were no intra-
industry suits in these industries).  Excluding observations missing key 
data, there were 1,240,580 such pair-year observations from 1984–99. 
Table 4, column one shows the simplest estimates.  Firm employment 
size is clearly significant for both parties with a coefficient of .54 for the 
patentee litigant and .39 for the alleged infringer.  Both coefficients are 
significantly greater than zero, suggesting that scale matters both for 
plaintiffs and defendants because it is associated with larger stakes in 
litigation.46  But both coefficients are also significantly less than one.  
This may be because larger companies may also be more diversified, so 
that the stakes for the particular business unit at risk do not grow as fast 
as the overall firm size.  If we imagine that employment simultaneously 
grows for both the firms, then we see that the probability of litigation 
grows by almost the same proportion (because .54 + .39 = .93).  Thus, we 
see evidence that a general increase in stakes is associated with an 
increasing in filing (Hypothesis 2). 
All the other continuous variables are scaled by firm employment.  The 
coefficient on the log of the patentee litigant’s patent portfolio per 
employee is also positive and highly significant, consistent with 
Hypothesis 3.  More patents mean that the patentee has better chances of 
winning in court against the prospective infringer.  This coefficient is also 
significantly less than one. 
 
46. To some extent, employment size may also pick up some measure of the number of 
enforcement opportunities and the degree of exposure to other firms’ patents. 
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The coefficient on the log of the alleged infringer’s patents per 
employee is negative, but not significantly different from zero, providing 
weak support for Hypothesis 4 (defensive patenting). 
Regarding the two parties’ R&D spending per employee, the 
coefficient for the patentee litigant is not significantly different from zero.  
This result holds for all of the variations shown in Table 4.  On the other 
hand, the coefficient for the alleged infringer’s R&D is positive in all 
variations and highly significant in all but the last column.  This result is 
consistent with Hypothesis 6 (exposure effect) and inconsistent with 
Hypothesis 5 (inventing around), however, this regression does not 
completely control for the stakes of each firm.  It is possible that the 
coefficient on firm 2’s R&D might be positive because this investment 
increases the stakes (profits) that firm 2 makes.  Employment size 
captures the magnitude of firm stakes to the first order, however, there 
might be some additional variation picked up by this coefficient.  Given 
that firm 1’s R&D does not seem to have such a positive effect on firm 
1’s stakes, this explanation seems unlikely.  To explore this issue more 
carefully, we will add further controls on firm stakes below. 
Column 2 adds our measure of technological proximity.  The 
coefficient is economically large and statistically highly significant, 
supporting Hypothesis 1.  This is a strong effect, especially since the 
sample only includes pairs that are already in the same primary SIC 
industry.  The addition of this variable reduces the scale coefficients a bit, 
perhaps suggesting that firms of larger size within an industry may also 
inevitably have more overlapping technology. 
Also, the coefficient on the alleged infringer’s patent portfolio size 
becomes more negative and statistically significant.  This suggests a 
possible interaction between “defensive” patenting and technological 
proximity.  This idea is explored further in column 3 where both patent 
portfolio size variables are interacted with a categorical variable 
indicating whether the firms have a technological closeness greater than 
or less than 0.5 (about 8% of the samples have technological closeness 
greater than 0.5).  Both of the close coefficients have larger magnitudes 
in absolute value than their distant counterparts.  This suggests that 
defensive patenting mainly affects litigation among firms that are close 
to rivals in technology space. 
The fourth column repeats the regression of the first column, but adds 
a term capturing the interaction of the two parties’ log patent portfolio 
sizes.  The coefficient of this term is not statistically significant.  We also 
tested a variety of other interactions to see if there were possible size 
interaction effects or asymmetric patent portfolio effects (e.g., large 
portfolio suing small portfolio).  None of these were significantly 
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different from zero. 
The fifth column repeats the regression of the first column, adding 
variables for log market value per employee and log capital per employee.  
The market value variable may capture aspects of the firms’ stakes at risk 
in litigation that are not captured by other variables.  The positive 
coefficients suggest this may be so.  The measure of capital intensity may 
indicate the extent to which the firm is at risk of holdup.  Alleged 
infringers with large capital costs may be particularly vulnerable to patent 
injunctions, so they may settle more readily, avoiding litigation.  The 
coefficient on the alleged infringer’s capital intensity is negative and 
significant at the 5% level, providing some support for this hypothesis.  
The coefficient on the patentee litigant’s capital intensity is also negative 
(but only significant at the 10% level), perhaps suggesting that capital 
intensive patent holders also settle more frequently to avoid holdup 
associated with counter-suits. 
With the additional control for firm stakes, the coefficient for firm 2’s 
R&D is still positive, however, it is no longer statistically significant.  
This provides weak support for Hypothesis 6 (exposure effect).  We will 
revisit this estimate in the next Section, where we measure the equivalent 
coefficient with greater precision. 
D. Regression Analysis of Aggregate Hazards 
As described above, the firm hazard of being a patentee litigant equals 
the sum of the probabilities of litigation for all possible firms the patentee 
might sue, assuming these probabilities are independent.  The hazard of 
being an alleged infringer is likewise a sum over possible plaintiffs.  This 
means that the coefficients of firm hazards may have a simple 
relationship to the coefficients estimated in Table 4.  In particular, if the 
coefficients on interaction terms involving a variable are zero, then the 
coefficients on that variable should match.  On the other hand, we 
estimate the hazards over a different sample than the sample used in Table 
4—the new sample includes suits where the opposing party may be in a 
different industry and may not be a public firm. 
Table 5 reports estimates of firm hazard Poisson regressions for all 
public firms from 1984 to 1999.  The dependent variable in the upper 
panel is the number of times that the firm is a patentee litigant in a year; 
in the lower panel, the dependent variable is the number of times that the 
firm is an alleged infringer in a year.  As before, the continuous variables 
are scaled by firm employment. 
Despite the difference in samples, the coefficients in column 1 are 
close to those in column 1 of Table 4: the coefficient on the patentee 
litigant’s log portfolio size per employee is .39 in both tables, the 
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coefficient on log employment is .47 compared to .54 in Table 4; the 
coefficient on the alleged infringer’s log deflated R&D per employee is 
.26 compared to .25 in Table 4, and that on log employment is .48 
compared to .39.  The only substantial difference is in the coefficients on 
the alleged infringer’s log patent portfolio per employee which is now 
.10, but was -.08 in Table 4.  Since we suggest above that this coefficient 
may be influenced by technological closeness, and since the current 
sample includes many more firms that are more distant (since they are no 
longer constrained to be in the same industry), this may reflect less 
defensive patenting among firms that are not technologically close. 
We tested this and all the other regressions in this Table for over-
dispersion, which we found to be significant.  For this reason, we use 
standard errors that are robust to heteroscedasticity.47  Also, we ran 
negative binomial regressions (not shown).  The coefficients on these 
were quite similar to those from the Poisson regressions. 
Column 2 adds the patentee litigant’s log R&D to employment (and a 
dummy variable for zero reported R&D) and log capital per employee in 
both regressions.  Column 3 further adds log market value per employee, 
the log of other firms’ closeness-weighted patent portfolios and the log 
of other firms’ closeness-weighted R&D.  As discussed above, the 
coefficients on capital intensity may reflect evidence of strategic 
patenting and they are both negative and significant.  The distance-
weighted measures do not appear to have significant effects, perhaps 
because other variables already capture the effect of close competitors. 
Note that now the coefficient on the alleged infringer’s R&D remains 
positive and highly significant, even when controlling for firm market 
value and employment.  Given these controls, the positive coefficient 
cannot be explained by any effect R&D might have on firm stakes.  
Instead, this finding rejects Hypothesis 5 (inventing around) and is 
consistent with Hypothesis 6 (exposure effect). 
Table 5 also shows the coefficients on industry dummies (“Other non-
manufacturing” is the excluded category).48  The pattern is quite similar 
to the pattern observed in Table 2.  Firms in chemical, pharmaceutical 
and instruments industries are more likely to sue; firms in non-
manufacturing industries are much less likely to sue.  Firms in electronics 
and instruments and retail/wholesale industries are more likely to be sued.  
 
47. The negative binomial estimates are inconsistent if the true distribution is not actually 
negative binomial.  The Poisson estimates, on the other hand, will still be consistent even with over-
dispersion, so we prefer to present Poisson estimates using heteroscedasticity-robust standard 
errors. 
48. Table 4 regressions also included industry dummies but these were not displayed because 
their standard errors are substantially larger than those in Table 5.  
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Firms in business services including software and other non-
manufacturing are less likely to be sued. 
Table 5 does not display the year dummies, but the year dummies for 
both regressions in column 3 are displayed in Figure 2.  Also, Table 5 
displays the average annual increase in the year dummies for each 
regression from 1987 to 1999.  The year dummies can be interpreted as 
relative (log) residuals, that is, as the portion of the hazard rate not 
explained by the observed right hand variables.  Trends in the residuals 
indicate the portion of the growth in firm litigation hazards that is not 
explained by these variables.  In particular, column 3 includes variables 
that correspond to many of the obvious explanations for the increase in 
litigation: patent portfolio variables capture the increase in patenting 
rates, R&D and capital variables capture the increase in both types of 
investment, market value variables capture otherwise unobserved 
changes in “innovative fertility” and other sources of firm value, 
employment variables capture changes in firm scale and the closeness-
weighted measure captures changes in technological density. 
The residual growth rates and the pattern shown in Figure 2 clearly 
show that most of the increase in both litigation hazards is not explained 
by these factors.  The residual accounts for most (68%) of the 5.5% 
annual growth rate in the hazard of being a patentee litigant and most 
(75%) of the 8.4% annual growth rate in the hazard of being an alleged 
infringer. 
In column 3, the log of market value per employee captures otherwise 
unobserved differences in the value of firms’ technologies.  Another way 
to capture these is by using forward patent citations, although this does 
reduce the sample size.  Column 4 shows a regression with the adjusted 
(for patent class) mean number of forward citations for each firm’s patent 
portfolio.49  Having a more highly cited patent portfolio does make a firm 
more likely to sue; it also makes a firm more likely to be sued.  The latter 
finding may suggest that some portion of causation runs from litigation 
to patent characteristics rather than the other way. 
Table 6 repeats the regressions from column 2 of Table 5 for different 
sub-samples (we also added a dummy variable for newly public firms).  
The first pair of columns conducts the regressions separately for firms in 
SIC 28 (chemical and pharmaceutical industries) and for a group of 
industries where strategic patenting behavior has been observed (SIC 35, 
36, 38 and 73, machinery including computers, electronics, instruments 
and business services including software).  One difference that stands out 
 
49. We also ran regressions using backward citations and claims.  The coefficient on backward 
citations was statistically significant, but small.  That on claims was insignificant on both counts. 
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is that patent portfolio size tends to be a relatively stronger determinant 
of litigation in the latter group while R&D tends to be a stronger influence 
in chemicals and pharmaceuticals.  This is, perhaps, not surprising given 
the relative importance the “thicket” industries place on patent portfolios.  
The larger coefficient on the patentee’s R&D in pharmaceuticals may 
suggest that R&D increases firm stakes; alternatively, it may simply be 
an artifact of the unusual role that generic manufacturers play in this 
industry’s litigation—R&D intensive drug manufacturers are more likely 
to sue than are low-R&D generic manufacturers. 
The second comparison is between large and small firms.  Generally, 
both patents and R&D tend to be more strongly associated with litigation 
among large firms than among small. 
Finally, the last pair of columns compares the regression at the 
beginning and end of the sample period.  Although the time dummies 
have increased dramatically during this period, the slope coefficients 
have not, in general, changed significantly. 
Table 7 shows estimates of the growth rate of the residuals for different 
sub-samples.  Here the regression is conducted from 1987–99 and 
includes a linear time trend instead of individual year dummies.  The 
Table reports the coefficient of the time trend (with standard error) 
expressed as an annual percentage rate.  Only one growth rate shows a 
statistically significant difference from the mean: the growth rate in the 
residual hazard for instrument firms as patentee litigants. 
IV. INTERPRETATION 
A. Drivers of Litigation: “Cheating” or “Exposure”? 
Summarizing the above results, the main factors influencing litigation 
hazards are the scale of the firms, the number of patents held by 
prospective plaintiffs, the R&D performed by prospective defendants, the 
capital intensity of the parties and, for the probability of litigation 
between a given pair of firms, the technological distance between them.  
Measured technological distance does not seem to matter much for the 
aggregate litigation hazards. 
This evidence supports several of our hypotheses.  Technological 
proximity matters for pairs of firms (H1).  Firm scale should be an 
important variable because it relates to the magnitude of what the firms 
have at stake in litigation (H2).  The importance of the prospective 
plaintiff’s patent portfolio size underlines the importance of refinement 
(H3)—firms can improve their prospects in patent disputes by building a 
larger patent portfolio, among other things. 
Our findings also cast considerable doubt on the idea that most patent 
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litigation is caused by outright piracy or other forms of “cheating” such 
as inventing around.  Most alleged infringers are not low-tech copyists 
who imitate to avoid R&D; instead, most invest heavily in R&D.  
Moreover, the probability of patent litigation increases with the level of 
the prospective defendant’s R&D spending even after controlling for firm 
size and market value.  This suggests that this R&D is not being directed 
to “inventing around,” rather, greater investment in technology seems to 
increase the firm’s exposure to infringement.  And the difficulty of 
avoiding inadvertent infringement is highlighted by the significant 
portion of lawsuits that occur between firms that are in completely 
different industries and are also technologically distant. 
Several other findings also cast doubt on the “cheating” story.  In a 
model of monitoring like that developed by Crampes and Langinier,50 
one would expect large firms to monitor more intensively, leading to less 
infringement and less litigation.  But the probability of litigation increases 
with the size of the prospective plaintiff.  Also, one would expect 
litigation to be far less in those industries where reverse engineering costs 
little.  But the computer and instruments industries have high rates of 
litigation per patent despite having well-developed practices of reverse 
engineering.  Indeed, this suggests a reason why relatively little litigation 
seems to be generated by cheating: cheating can occur only if firms find 
it costly or difficult to monitor for infringement.  However, if monitoring 
(reverse engineering) is costly or difficult, then trade secrecy is probably 
relatively effective and firms may therefore be less likely to patent in the 
first place. 
We conclude that although cheating certainly occurs in some instances, 
most litigation appears to be driven by “exposure,” and, consequently, 
firms’ rapidly growing hazard of being sued for infringement likely 
reduces their R&D incentives. 
B. The Effect of Patent Portfolio Size 
The data in Table 2 imply that litigation imposes a much larger burden 
on small firms.  Lanjouw and Schankerman find evidence of large 
differences in litigation rates per patent across size groups.51  Our 
evidence affirms theirs and, in addition, we find evidence that small firms 
have much higher rates of litigation as alleged infringers per R&D dollar. 
Lanjouw and Schankerman suggest that this “portfolio size effect” 
may be due to two forms of strategic interaction: (1) patent trading where 
 
50. Crampes & Langinier, supra note 7, at 260–62 (modeling monitoring decisions using one 
static game scenario and two alternative sequential games). 
51. Lanjouw & Schankerman, Small Firms, supra note 11, at 63. 
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firms with large patent portfolios more easily cross-license and settle 
rather than litigate, and (2) repeated interaction between large firms, also 
inducing more frequent settlement.52  These explanations attribute the 
size effect to the interaction between the firms—there is less litigation 
when the alleged infringer is able to retaliate with a countersuit using its 
own patents either in the disputed market or, given repeated interactions, 
in other markets and at other times. 
We do find significant evidence of some such interaction between 
firms: a firm with greater capital intensity is less likely to sue, perhaps 
because of the greater risk of retaliation; a firm with greater capital 
intensity is less likely to be sued, perhaps because such firms settle more 
readily.  However, a standard deviation change in capital intensity only 
changes the probability of litigation by about 20%, so this cannot explain 
the large observed differences in litigation per patent. 
We also find some evidence of patent trading and defensive patenting.  
However, defensive patenting only seems to play a limited role reducing 
litigation between firms that are technologically close.  The size of the 
defendant’s portfolio does not reduce litigation hazard in the aggregate. 
Instead, our regressions suggest that there may be a more basic 
explanation for the portfolio size effect that does not depend on strategic 
interaction between firms, namely, that there may be diminishing returns 
to patent portfolio size.  In all of our regressions, the coefficient on the 
plaintiff’s patent portfolio size per employee is well below one.  Of 
course this ignores the effect of the plaintiff firm’s size.  Our regressions 
cannot fully distinguish between the effect of the plaintiff’s scale, which 
may affect litigation because it changes the plaintiff’s stake, and the direct 
effect of patent portfolio size.  But even assuming that the coefficient on 
log employment is entirely due to the greater number of patents held by 
larger firms, the sum of the two coefficients in Table 5 is still significantly 
less than one.  For example, in column 5, the combined effect of 
employment and patents per employee has an elasticity of 0.86. 
At first glance, the idea of diminishing returns to patent portfolio size 
may seem counter-intuitive.  After all, if two firms merge, pooling their 
patent portfolios, why should this affect the rate of litigation per patent?  
But such a merger would affect the probability of winning a suit against 
a third firm—the probability of winning a suit will typically not double.53  
 
52. Id. at 46–47. 
53. See Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 36 
(2005) (showing that while individual patents may not proportionally increase litigation rates, 
patent portfolios can “serve as important defense mechanisms in a highly litigious environment”); 
James Bessen, Patent Thickets: Strategic Patenting of Complex Technologies 3 (Oct. 3, 2002) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.researchoninnovation.org/thicket.pdf (expl-
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For example, this will be the case if each patent has an independent 
probability of being found valid and infringed.  And this means that the 
probability of litigation need not double either.  Patent portfolio size 
exhibits diminishing returns to the probability of winning a suit.  This 
means, in turn, that the probability of litigation increases less than 
proportionately with the plaintiff’s patent portfolio size. 
C. The Growth in Hazard Rates 
Measured firm characteristics seem to explain only a fraction of the 
growth in firm litigation hazards.  The majority of the increase cannot be 
explained by the growth in R&D spending, the value of firm technology, 
the growth in technological crowdedness or the growth in patenting 
(either because of “innovative fertility” or because of greater patent 
propensity). 
What else might explain this rapid growth?  We can think of two broad 
classes of factors: technology and legal changes.  Technology might 
cause increased litigation if technological changes tended to erode 
industry norms of cooperation or mutual forbearance.  For example, as 
technologies mature, industries often experience shake-outs.  This might 
give rise to sales of patents to “trolls” by distressed firms or to anti-
competitive actions by established firms, both possibly increasing 
litigation.  However, this explanation seems unlikely, given that the 
growth of the residual in Table 7 does not vary sharply across industries. 
It does not seem likely that all industries experienced shakeouts in the 
1990s. 
Technology might have also increased the cost of monitoring for 
infringement, leading to more “cheating” and more detected disputes.  
But this explanation does not seem promising because the increase in 
litigation seems to occur across all technologies, and thus we need to 
identify some far-reaching event that has increased the cost monitoring 
for patent infringement in all sorts of technology.  The Internet and other 
improvements in communications probably have reduced the cost of 
monitoring. 
Another technological factor might be the greater use of general-
purpose technologies.  Suppose that firms in a wide variety of industries 
began using general purpose technologies more intensively and also 
patented these technologies.  This might lead to greater litigation for two 
reasons: first, firms might be more likely to innocently infringe because 
they do not search applications outside of their own industry as 
 
aining that “the more patents a firm has related to a given product, the greater the joint probability 
of prevailing at trial”).  
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intensively (and there may be many more patents to search); second, 
inter-industry disputes might be less likely to settle because disputants 
are not likely to interact repeatedly. 
One candidate for such general-purpose technology patents is 
software, which, of course, also went through a change in legal status.  
Software patents are obtained across a wide variety of industries and are 
used in a wide variety of applications.  Using a definition of software 
patent from Bessen and Hunt,54 we found that software patents accounted 
for 3% of the main patents litigated in 1984 and 17% in 1999.  Moreover, 
note that some of the industries that use software do tend to have 
somewhat higher residual growth rates in Table 7, especially as alleged 
infringers.  So software patents contributed to the growth in the litigation 
residual.  However, this does not seem to be the main factor, especially 
since, again, Table 7 indicates that all industries exhibited substantial 
growth in the residual. 
This leaves various legal changes as the likely candidates for the 
dominant factors affecting the growth in the litigation residual.  Landes 
and Posner suggest that the creation of a unified appeals court for patent 
cases increased the uncertainty of legal outcomes instead of improving 
the predictability of patent law, leading to increased litigation.55  Our 
results are consistent with this view, especially greater “noise” regarding 
the interpretation of standards of patentability and vaguer boundaries of 
patent claims. 
Another factor may have been a pro-patentee shift in the law.  Such a 
shift might lead to more litigation (although in some circumstances it 
might just lead to less infringement).  Litigation may have become more 
attractive if the risk of patent invalidation (e.g., for obviousness) were 
decreased.  Lunney presents evidence of just such a switch—reviewing 
appellate decisions, he finds a sharp decrease in the portion of patents 
found invalid, although he also finds an increase in the portion of patents 
found not to be infringed.56 
These legal changes would tend to affect firms in all industries, 
consistent with our estimates.  And the fact that the rapid growth in 
litigation began after 1987—just five years after the creation of the Court 
 
54. Bessen & Hunt, supra note 24, at 8 (defining a “software patent” as one that “involves a 
logic algorithm for processing data that is implemented via stored instructions; that is, the logic is 
not ‘hard-wired’”). 
55. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 12, at 334–53. 
56. Glynn Lunney, Jr., Patent Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A Quiet 
Revolution, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (2004); see also Matthew D. Henry & John L. Turner, The 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s Impact on Patent Litigation, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 85, 90 
(2005) (analyzing how the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s stronger presumption of 
validity impacts litigation outcomes at the district court level).   
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of Appeals for the Federal Circuit—adds weight to this interpretation.  
Thus, barring some explanation we have not considered, legal changes 
seem to be the dominant factor accounting for the rapid rise in litigation. 
CONCLUSION 
Most of the rapid increase in patent litigation hazards over the 1990s 
cannot be explained by firm patenting rates, R&D spending, firm value 
or industry composition.  Looking at a variety of explanations, we 
conclude that legal changes may be the dominant factor driving this 
increase.  This implies that the increase in patent litigation represents a 
growing disincentive to R&D that is not likely offset by growth in the 
number or value of innovations. 
Furthermore, we find evidence that this disincentive is borne by firms 
not only in their roles as patent holders, but also as innovators having to 
defend against patent lawsuits.  We find that the more R&D a firm 
performs, the more likely it is to be sued.  In most industries, this pattern 
of litigation is inconsistent with the view that most defendants in patent 
lawsuits are simple pirates or imitators.  Instead, patent defendants are, to 
a large degree, innovators themselves, spending as much on R&D as the 
plaintiffs.  Moreover, about a quarter of patent lawsuits occur between 
firms that are in different industries and are also “technologically 
distant,” suggesting that ex ante licensing and avoidance of patent 
disputes are difficult.  Thus an important part of the burden of patent 
disputes falls on defending firms.  This distinction is important because 
although the rate of litigation per patent among public firms as plaintiffs 
did not increase much from 1987 to 1999, the rate of litigation per R&D 
dollar among public firms as defendants increased 70%. 
Also, as Lanjouw and Schankerman find,57 the risk of litigation falls 
disproportionately on small firms.  However, this does not appear to be 
mainly the result of better dispute resolution among large firms through 
patent trading and “defensive” patenting.  We find that the defendant’s 
portfolio size has, at best, only a limited effect on the probability of 
litigation, mainly among firms that are technologically close.  Any 
optimism that “defensive” patenting might serve to reduce the growth of 
litigation is probably misplaced. 
Finally, our results shed some light on the changes in litigation 
hazards, but our results are limited in that they say nothing about the 
actual costs associated with filing lawsuits and subsequent litigation and 
the effects of these costs on R&D.  Nevertheless, there is cause for 
concern.  Event studies find that the joint market value of plaintiffs and 
 
57. Lanjouw & Schankerman, Small Firms, supra note 11, at 63. 
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defendants falls by 2–3% on the filing of a patent lawsuit,58 suggesting 
that the economic burden on litigants may be substantial.  So the recent 
doubling of litigation hazards may well impose substantial costs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
58. See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat, James A. Brickley & Jeffrey L. Coles, The Costs of Inefficient 
Bargaining and Financial Distress: Evidence from Corporate Lawsuits, 35 J. FIN. ECON. 221, 230–
31 (1994) (reporting wealth effects of corporate lawsuits); Lerner, supra note 3, at 471 (finding that 
the combined market value of firms fell by an average of 3.1% in the two days after the Wall Street 
Journal reported the lawsuit filing).  
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1. Sample Characteristics 
 Means 
    Litigants by type 
 All 
Firms 
All 
Patenters 
All 
Litigants 
Patentees Alleged 
Infringers 
R&D 37.6 69.8 244.8 261.9 307.1 
Employment 5.2 10.0 23.7 24.4 28.5 
Sales 846.7 1933.9 5147.6 5382.7 6195.5 
Portfolio size 44.1 92.7 375.8 424.6 442.7 
Portfolio adjusted 
claims/patent 
3.0 2.8 2.9 2.5 
Portfolio adjusted cites 
made/patent 
2.0 2.2 2.4 2.1 
Portfolio adjusted cites 
rec'd/patent 
3.1 3.5 3.8 3.2 
New firm 38% 22% 19% 16% 19% 
No R&D 70% 31% 21% 16% 22% 
No Patents 77%  13% 8% 16% 
      
 Medians 
R&D 2.9 6.4 25.8 33.7 29.6 
Employment 0.5 1.2 4.4 5.1 5.5 
Sales 64.9 171.1 654.4 832.9 793.6 
Portfolio size 0 6 31 51 30 
Note: Litigants exclude firms in retail and wholesaling industries and in SIC 
6794, patent holding & franchising companies.  118,495 observations from 
1984–99.  Employment is in thousands.  R&D and sales are deflated by the 
GDP deflator.  New firms are observations where the firm has been listed in 
Compustat for five or fewer years.  Portfolio size is the number of patents 
granted over the previous eight years. 
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Table 2. Litigation Hazards for Firms with Patent Portfolios and 
Positive R&D 
 As Patentee 
Litigant 
As Alleged 
Infringer 
 Expected 
Suits per 
year 
Suits 
per 
1000 
patents 
Expected 
Suits per 
year 
Suits 
per 
$billion 
R&D 
     
All Firms  0.223 11.8 0.185 2.5 
    1987 0.198 10.5 0.116 1.7 
    1999 0.271 11.7 0.256 2.9 
Small firms 
(employment<500) 
0.079 42.5 0.064 12.3 
Large firms 
(employment>=500) 
0.304 10.7 0.254 2.2 
New firms 0.114 30.3 0.095 5.9 
     
BY INDUSTRY     
Chemicals/pharmaceuticals 0.334 14.4 0.229 2.1 
Machinery/computers 0.217 13.0 0.170 2.3 
Electronics 0.202 8.8 0.194 3.6 
   SIC 3674 0.216 7.8 0.225 3.2 
Instruments 0.216 17.6 0.191 6.4 
Other manufacturing 0.230 10.3 0.188 1.8 
Business svcs/software 0.108 8.4 0.103 1.3 
Retail/wholesale 0.021 5.9 0.111 10.9 
Other non-manufacturing 0.141 8.0 0.152 2.1 
Note: 20,522 observations from 1984–99 for firms with positive patent 
portfolio size and positive R&D.  R&D figures are deflated by the GDP 
deflator.  Raw hazard rates have been adjusted for underreporting (divided 
by .64). 
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Table 3. Lawsuits by Technological Closeness and Industry Overlap 
Technological 
Closeness 
No 
industry 
overlap 
Weakly 
overlapping 
industries 
Same 
primary 
industry 
Total 
Distant 24% 28% 11% 63% 
Close 4% 15% 18% 37% 
     
Total 28% 43% 29% 100% 
Note: For 680 lawsuits where parties on both sides are public firms.  Firms 
in the retail and wholesale industries have been excluded.  “Same primary 
industry” means both parties’ primary business is in the same four-digit SIC 
industry.  “Weakly overlapping industries” means the parties had a business 
segment in the same three-digit SIC industry.  “Distant” and “close” refer to 
a closeness measure >=.5 and <.5 respectively. 
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Table 4. Logit Regression of Probability of Suit 
 
 1  2  3  4  5  
Patentee litigant           
Log patents/employee 0.40 (0.07) 0.38 (0.07)   0.45 (0.09) 0.41 (0.07) 
Ln patent/emp * distant     0.35 (0.08)     
Ln patent/emp * close     0.43 (0.08)     
Zero patents dummy -1.62 (0.62) -1.31 (0.62) -1.30 (0.63) -1.57 (0.62) -1.92 (0.75) 
Log employment 0.54 (0.03) 0.46 (0.04) 0.47 (0.04) 0.53 (0.03) 0.56 (0.04) 
Log R&D/employee 0.00 (0.09) -0.07 (0.09) -0.07 (0.09)   -0.12 (0.09) 
No R&D dummy 0.25 (0.41) 0.28 (0.42) 0.27 (0.42)     
Log Mkt. 
Value/employee 
        0.26 (0.09) 
Log capital/employee         -0.23 (0.13) 
           
Alleged Infringer           
Log patents/employee -0.08 (0.06) -0.16 (0.06)   0.00 (0.11) -0.04 (0.06) 
Ln patent/emp * distant     -0.08 (0.07)     
Ln patent/emp * close     -0.23 (0.07)     
Zero patents dummy -0.92 (0.29) -0.71 (0.30) -0.65 (0.30) -0.93 (0.29) -1.07 (0.33) 
Log R&D/employee 0.25 (0.08) 0.18 (0.08) 0.18 (0.08) 0.25 (0.08) 0.13 (0.10) 
No R&D dummy 0.12 (0.38) 0.15 (0.39) 0.19 (0.39) 0.17 (0.38) 0.32 (0.39) 
Log employment 0.39 (0.04) 0.28 (0.04) 0.28 (0.04) 0.39 (0.04) 0.13 (0.09) 
Log Mkt. 
Value/employee 
        0.30 (0.09) 
Log capital/employee         -0.26 (0.13) 
           
Interaction terms           
plaintiff ln pat/emp*defendant ln pat/emp     -0.03 (0.03)   
Technological closeness   2.35 (0.24) 2.47 (0.38)     
           
Number of obs 1,240,580  1,240,580  1,240,580  1,240,580  994,148  
Log likelihood = -1568.9  -1522.8  -1521.3  -1568.6  -1400.4  
Note: Logit regressions with industry and year dummies not shown.  
Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses.  Patents are the portfolio size, that 
is, the number of patents granted the previous eight years.  Dummy variables 
report zero patents and zero R&D.  R&D and market value are deflated by 
the GDP deflator, capital is property, plant and equipment deflated by the 
NIPA capital goods deflator and employment is in thousands.  Technological 
closeness measure is described in text. 
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Table 5. Poisson Regressions of the Number of Suits Per Year 
 1  2  3  4  
Suits as patentee litigant        
Log portfolio size 0.39 (0.02) 0.37 (0.02) 0.36 (0.02) 0.40 (0.03) 
Portfolio=0 dummy -1.46 (0.14) -1.41 (0.15) -1.20 (0.21)   
Portfolio size missing -0.98 (0.19) -0.89 (0.19) -0.91 (0.20)   
Log R&D/emp.   0.10 (0.03) -0.06 (0.03) 0.09 (0.03) 
R&D not reported   -0.30 (0.11) -0.39 (0.11) 0.04 (0.12) 
Log employment 0.47 (0.01) 0.49 (0.01) 0.51 (0.02) 0.51 (0.02) 
Log capital/emp.   -0.23 (0.03) -0.40 (0.04) -0.33 (0.05) 
Log mkt. Value/emp.     0.39 (0.04)   
Log other firms' patents     -0.02 (0.11)   
Log other firms' R&D     0.06 (0.11)   
Adj. Cites rec'd/patent       0.017 (0.003) 
Chemicals/pharmaceuticals 1.18 (0.19) 0.86 (0.19) 0.82 (0.20) 0.73 (0.22) 
Machinery/computers 0.88 (0.18) 0.46 (0.19) 0.57 (0.20) 0.31 (0.22) 
Electronics 0.95 (0.18) 0.55 (0.19) 0.66 (0.20) 0.34 (0.22) 
Instruments 1.20 (0.19) 0.74 (0.20) 0.82 (0.21) 0.59 (0.24) 
Other manufacturing 0.63 (0.17) 0.42 (0.17) 0.47 (0.17) 0.28 (0.20) 
Business svcs/software 0.52 (0.21) -0.05 (0.23) 0.00 (0.23) -0.12 (0.29) 
Retail/wholesale -0.80 (0.26) -1.05 (0.27) -0.81 (0.28) -0.64 (0.40) 
Residual growth (sample: 5.5%) 4.0%  4.7%  3.7%  6.1%  
Log likelihood =  -9751.1  -9645.3  -9035.3  -7187.8  
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Table 5, continued        
Suits as alleged infringer        
Log portfolio size 0.10 (0.02) 0.11 (0.02) 0.11 (0.02) 0.17 (0.02) 
Portfolio=0 dummy -0.75 (0.09) -0.76 (0.09) -0.60 (0.11)   
Portfolio size missing -1.23 (0.12) -1.19 (0.12) -1.13 (0.12)   
Log R&D/emp. 0.26 (0.02) 0.28 (0.02) 0.15 (0.03) 0.25 (0.03) 
R&D not reported -0.23 (0.09) -0.22 (0.09) -0.29 (0.09) 0.11 (0.11) 
Log employment 0.48 (0.01) 0.50 (0.01) 0.53 (0.01) 0.53 (0.01) 
Log capital/emp.   -0.12 (0.02) -0.30 (0.03) -0.23 (0.04) 
Log mkt. Value/emp.     0.35 (0.03)   
Log other firms' patents     0.12 (0.09)   
Log other firms' R&D     -0.10 (0.10)   
Adj. Cites rec'd/patent       0.014 (0.003) 
Chemicals/pharmaceuticals 0.65 (0.13) 0.53 (0.13) 0.49 (0.13) 0.18 (0.14) 
Machinery/computers 0.55 (0.12) 0.36 (0.13) 0.48 (0.13) -0.02 (0.14) 
Electronics 0.79 (0.12) 0.61 (0.12) 0.70 (0.13) 0.18 (0.14) 
Instruments 1.04 (0.13) 0.84 (0.13) 0.89 (0.14) 0.40 (0.14) 
Other manufacturing 0.43 (0.10) 0.30 (0.10) 0.34 (0.11) -0.09 (0.12) 
Business svcs/software 0.01 (0.15) -0.26 (0.16) -0.26 (0.16) -0.49 (0.22) 
Retail/wholesale 0.85 (0.11) 0.61 (0.12) 0.75 (0.12) 0.70 (0.22) 
Residual growth (sample: 8.4%) 6.7%  7.2%  6.3%  8.5%  
Number of obs 93,333  87,856  76,843  15,811  
Log likelihood =  -10253.4  -10153.9  -9318.8  -6014.5  
Note: Regressions are Poisson regressions with year dummies and 
independent variables lagged one year.  Standard errors are heteroscedastic 
robust.  R&D and market value are deflated by the GDP deflator, capital is 
property, plant and equipment deflated by the NIPA capital goods deflator 
and employment is in thousands.  Cites received is adjusted for mean for 
patent class.  Residual growth is annual growth rate of time dummies. 
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Table 6. Separate Litigation Poisson Regressions Dependent Variable: 
Number of Lawsuits as Patentee Litigants or Alleged Infringers 
 Industry Group Firm Employment Size Year 
Lagged 
independent 
variables 
Chemicals & 
pharma-
ceuticals 
Thicket 
Industries 
<500 500 84 – 91 92 – 99 
Patentee Litigants             
Log portfolio size 0.23 (0.06) 0.38 (0.03) 0.28 (0.06) 0.41 (0.03) 0.41 (0.04) 0.35 (0.03) 
Portfolio=0 
dummy 
0.14 (0.35) -1.39 (0.21) -1.13 (0.26) -2.00 (0.23) -1.24 (0.23) -1.53 (0.19) 
Portfolio size 
missing 
-0.91 (0.48) -0.96 (0.32) -1.03 (0.26) -0.69 (0.28) -1.14 (0.32) -0.73 (0.24) 
Log R&D/emp. 0.41 (0.07) -0.04 (0.04) -0.12 (0.05) 0.22 (0.04) 0.11 (0.05) 0.09 (0.04) 
R&D not reported -0.33 (0.56) -0.29 (0.18) -0.80 (0.27) -0.08 (0.12) -0.27 (0.17) -0.39 (0.15) 
Log capital/emp. -0.43 (0.09) -0.02 (0.05) -0.20 (0.09) -0.28 (0.04) -0.25 (0.06) -0.20 (0.04) 
Log employment 0.74 (0.04) 0.45 (0.02) 0.49 (0.07) 0.47 (0.02) 0.48 (0.02) 0.50 (0.02) 
Newly public firm -0.45 (0.23) 0.28 (0.13) 0.28 (0.14) 0.28 (0.15) -0.01 (0.16) 0.27 (0.12) 
No. Observations 5345  26684 43464  44458  40518  47404  
Log likelihood -1451  -4692 -2480  -7007  -3827  -5798  
Alleged Infringers 
            
Log portfolio size 0.04 (0.06) 0.18 (0.02) 0.02 (0.05) 0.14 (0.02) 0.12 (0.03) 0.11 (0.02) 
Portfolio=0 
dummy 
-0.43 (0.35) -0.59 (0.13) -0.56 (0.21) -1.06 (0.11) -0.96 (0.14) -0.66 (0.11) 
Portfolio size 
missing 
-0.41 (0.46) -1.32 (0.22) -1.42 (0.20) -1.08 (0.14) -1.27 (0.19) -1.16 (0.14) 
Log R&D/emp. 0.36 (0.06) 0.20 (0.03) 0.20 (0.05) 0.31 (0.03) 0.27 (0.04) 0.28 (0.03) 
R&D not reported -1.68 (0.61) 0.04 (0.15) -0.30 (0.26) -0.07 (0.09) -0.21 (0.14) -0.17 (0.11) 
Log capital/emp. -0.25 (0.09) 0.07 (0.04) -0.06 (0.06) -0.15 (0.03) -0.15 (0.04) -0.10 (0.03) 
Log employment 0.60 (0.03) 0.47 (0.02) 0.40 (0.06) 0.51 (0.02) 0.50 (0.02) 0.51 (0.01) 
Newly public firm 0.02 (0.23) 0.03 (0.09) 0.31 (0.11) 0.10 (0.09) 0.16 (0.11) 0.14 (0.08) 
No. Observations 5345  26684 43464  44458  40518  47404 
 
Log likelihood -1209  -4497 -2415  -7684  -3804  -6352 
 
Note: Regressions are Poisson regressions with year dummies, industry 
dummies and independent variables lagged one year.  Standard errors are 
heteroscedastic robust.  R&D, cashflow and market value are deflated by the 
GDP deflator, capital is property, plant and equipment deflated by the NIPA 
capital goods deflator and employment is in thousands.  The “new firm” 
dummy is equal to one for the first five years a firm appears in Compustat.  
Thicket industries are SIC 35, 36, 38 and 73. 
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Table 7. Annual Growth Rate of Residual for Sub-samples 
 linear trend 1987-99 
 As patentee litigant As alleged infringer 
Chemicals/pharmaceuticals 2.9% (2.4)% 7.4% (1.9)% 
Machinery/computers 5.7% (1.9)% 8.3% (1.7)% 
Electronics 6.6% (2.3)% 2.9% (1.8)% 
Instruments 9.3% (1.9)% 7.2% (1.9)% 
Other manufacturing 6.2% (1.5)% 7.7% (1.3)% 
Business services/software 2.3% (4.7)% 9.2% (4.0)% 
Retail/wholesale 8.1% (6.3)% 4.3% (2.7)% 
Other non-manufacturing -1.1% (4.2)% 6.8% (2.6)% 
     
New firms 7.8% (2.2)% 5.4% (1.7)% 
Incumbent firms 3.9% (1.0)% 6.3% (0.7)% 
Small firms 5.1% (1.8)% 5.7% (1.7)% 
Large firms 4.4% (1.0)% 6.4% (0.7)% 
     
ALL 4.3% (0.9)% 6.1% (0.7)% 
Note: Regressions are Poisson regressions with linear year trend from 1987–
99.  Independent variables are lagged one year.  Standard errors, in 
parentheses, are heteroscedasticity robust.  New firms (incumbent firms) 
have been listed in Compustat for five years or fewer (more).  Small firms 
(large firms) have fewer than 500 employees (more). 
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Figure 1. Patent Lawsuits Filed Annually (Derwent data from USPTO) 
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Figure 2. Residual Time Trends for Litigation Hazards from Table 5, 
Column 3. 
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